Panth, Kismet, Dharm te Qaum: continuity and change in four dimensions of Punjabi religion by Ballard, Roger
 
 
1
Published in Singh and Thadi (eds) Punjabi Identity in a Global Context Delhi, OUP 199 
 
Panth, Kismet, Dharm te Qaum:  
 
continuity and change in four dimensions of Punjabi religion 
 
 
Roger Ballard 
 
Although Punjabi society has long been marked by religious diversity, until little more than a 
century ago Punjabis of differing religious persuasions lived together in relative peace and 
harmony. But since then much has changed. With the eruption of religious reform 
movements explicitly committed to socio-religious differentiation, the former condition of 
easy-going pluralism was swept away by processes of ever more vigorous polarisation, much 
to the distress, it must be said, to many of those involved. Yet how can we best explain these 
extraordinary developments? Why was it that religion suddenly became such a bone of 
contention that those who differe  ceased to respect each other, and instead started to attack 
each other with such viciousness? Were the underlying tensions between Punjab's various 
religious traditions so great that the smallest spark was sufficient to precipitate a cataclysm? 
But if that was really so, why is the current condition of polarisation so unprecedented? 
Could it then be that far from being an outcome of ancient hatreds, current disjunctions are 
better understood as a modern phenomenon? If so, which aspects of modernity hav been 
most responsible? British colonialism? Christian missionaries? An inadequately developed 
and/or an insufficiently progressive Independence movement? Stupidity? Democracy? False 
Consciousness? Fundamentalism?  
 
Although champions for every one of these arguments can easily be found, none seems 
particularly satisfactory. Despite much spilt ink, no analytical perspective which makes 
comprehensive sense of Punjab's experience of polarisation has yet to be developed. Nor is 
this problem in any way specific to Punjab: while similar processes of ethno-religious 
polarisation can be readily observed in every quarter of the globe, all seem equally intractable 
– and just as inexplicable. It follows that any lessons we may learn about the nature and 
dynamics of such processes in a Punjabi context may well be applicable elsewhere, and of 
course vice-versa. 
 
 
The intractability of ethnic polarisation 
 
Let us consider for a moment some of the more obvious reasons why ethnic conflicts seem 
both to be so intractable and so explosive. First, the underlying (and usually mutual) 
processes of polarisation are invariably accompanied by the development of powerful 
currents of hostility towards outsiders, together with equally strong feelings of loyalty 
towards insiders; hence wh n open conflict does finally erupt, it is often accompanied by a 
cataclysmic release of violence. In Punjab's case well over 100,000 people lost their lives in 
1947, and a further 10 million fled their ancestral homes, never to return. Nor did polarisation 
end there. Parallel – if so far rather less destructive – disjunctions have since emerged 
between Hindus and Sikhs in Indian Punjab, as well as between Muslims, Ahmadiyyas and 
Christians across the border in Pakistan.  
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A second striking feature of these conflicts is the inability of anyone but the most enthusiastic 
xenophobes to offer any coherent explanation of their dynamics. Such perplexity is, of 
course, by no means unique to the Punjab. Western European social science – whether 
Marxist, Functionalist, Post-modern or Liberal – finds itself just as perplexed by such 
processes. According to conventional expectations, in a "modern" (or at least "post-modern"), 
"civilised", and "rational" world, neither xenophobic exclusionism nor its regular partner, 
fanatical in-group loyalty, should have the popular appeal which they so manifestly do. How, 
then, can such tendencies be accounted for? One much favoured explanation, particularly in 
colonial contexts, was that the social and cultural traditions of non-Europeans were so 
unmodern, so unsophisticated and so irrational that they were left particularly vulnerable to 
the appeals of parochial tribalism and religious fundamentalism. Yet reassuring however 
reassuring this view may once have been to its European exponents, after the holocaust in 
Germany, the collapse of Yugoslavia, let alone the steady growth of inter- acial and inter-
ethnic hostility in Europe and North America, there is now so much contemporary evidence 
to the contrary that it can no longer carry mu h conviction. Moreover the moment one brings 
Europe's appalling record of mayhem and slaughter during five centuries of religiously-
legitimised Imperial expansion, it becomes clear that the European track-record of ethno-
religious savagery is almost certainly a great deal longer than that of anyone else.1 Thus while 
ethno-religious polarisation in Punjab is manifestly a product of local contingencies, it is 
anything but unique.  
 
Against this background my aim in this Chapter is not so much to explore the political 
dynamics of polarisation in Punjab, but rather to examine its more religiousdim nsions.2 In 
so doing I not only wish to consider how, why and what basis religious ideas have proved to 
be such an effective vehicle for political mobilisation in this context, but also how the whole 
character of Punjabi religion has been transformed as a result of a century of reformist 
criticism and mobilisation. Although there is still a strong sense, as we shall see, in which 
these transformations have been more apparent than real, they have nevertheless been so 
extensive – or so I shall argue – that the ideas and practices which it is currently conventional 
to identify as constituting Hindu, Sikh and Muslim orthodoxy are far less ancient than is 
commonly assumed. On the contrary they are very largely a product of the fertile processes of 
religious reconstruction which were let loose by nineteenth century reform movements. 
Hence my central objective in this Chapter is to explore – and also to construct an analytical 
vocabulary to account for – the radical changes which have taken place in the character of 
Punjabi religion during the past century.  
 
Reconceptualising Religion in a Punjabi context 
 
As Oberoi comments, religion is a slippery concept at the best of times, and as he goes on to 
show in his path breaking study The Construction of Religious Boundaries (Oberoi 1994), 
during the early years of British rule very little of what went on in the Punjabi religious arena 
either conformed to, or could be illuminated by conventional Euro-centric expectations. Nor 
has the situation improved significantly as a result of subsequent developments. In my view 
the currently conventional vocabulary for the study of religion remains as misleading as ever, 
certainly with respect to Punjab, and quite possibly in many other contexts, including 
Western Europe, as well. It is not hard to see why. Firstly one of the most central assumptions 
of the European enlightenment was that social progress would necessarily be accompanied by 
a steady trend towards secularisation, with the result that religion would progressively be 
restricted to the privacy of the personal and domestic domain – if, indeed, it survived at all; 
and although this view was also transmitted to elite groups throughout the t ird world, where 
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it often remains an article of faith amongst "progressive" intellectuals, it is a perspective 
which empirical developments have now rendered comprehensively threadbare.3 Secondly, 
and in consequence, the entrenchment of an impoverished and deeply Euro-centric 
understanding of what it is that religion might entail has almost wholly obscured the fact that 
religious experience can include a number of quite different dimensions, each which exert 
differential levels of interest and attraction over different groups of devotees. Instead Euro-
centric assumptions have promoted a much more unitary vision of what religion is all about. 
Grounded in the spirit of the Protestant reformation, it seeks to reduce all religions to 
essentialised -isms. Within this framework texts are routinely prioritised over tradition, 
aspirations to moral and behavioural conformity over spiritual experience, and formal belief 
over ritual practice. Moreover it is also assumed that only the first half of each of these 
oppositions is properly "religious". Hence the second is either overlooked, or dismissed as 
nothing but irrational superstition.  
 
The intellectual hegemony of these philosophical assumptions, as well as of the analytical 
vocabulary to which they have given rise is in my view thoroughly pernicious. Besides being 
a major obstacle to the acquisition of a more insightful and illuminating understanding of the 
role of religion in contemporary Europe, this alien outlook causes even greater confusion in 
South Asian contexts. If so, it follows that the best way of circumventing the crippling impact 
of these assumptions is to look elsewhere for theoretical inspiration. Hence even though my 
own personal roots are thoroughly European, being invited to present the Inaugural Address 
at the First International Punjab Studies Conference provided me with an excellent 
opportunity in which to try and throw off those blinkers, and to adopt a more open-minded 
approach. It follows, therefore, that my use of Punjabi to entitle my address, and my ecision 
to retain it here should not be seen as mere exoticism. Rather it represents a deliberate effort 
to step beyond the analytical log-j ms which are invariably precipitated when Eurocentric 
conceptual schema is uncritically applied in a Punjabi context.  
 
In doing so I share common ground with Oberoi, who makes exactly the same point in the 
opening sentence of his book:
It is all very well for historians to think, speak and write about Islam, 
Hinduism and Sikhism, but they rarely pause to consider if such clear-cut 
categories actually found expression in the consciousness, actions, and cultural 
performances of the actors they describe.... (with respect to historical material 
from) nineteenth century Punjab I was constantly struck by the brittleness of
our textbook classifications. There simply wasn't any one-to-one 
correspondence between the categories which were supposed to govern 
religious behaviour on the one hand, and the way in which people actually 
experienced their everyday lives on the other. (Oberoi 1994: 1-2) 
 
But in taking advantage of the conceptual space which Oberoi has opened up, and especially 
of his emphasis on the intrinsic clumsiness of the concept of religion, I have also drawn 
further inspiration from Mark Juergensmeyer's work, and especially from the careful 
distinction which he sets out between the pa thic, dharmic and qaumic dimensions of 
religion in his study of the rise of the Ad Dharm movement amongst Punjab's untouchables. 
In my view Juergensmeyer's conceptual distinction offers a particularly attractive analytical 
starting point. Precisely because it is grounded in a Punjabi (as opposed to a Latin Christian) 
philosophical and conceptual universe, this schema enables us to unpack the otherwise 
undifferentiated phenomenon of religion in a particularly illuminating way.  
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It would, of course, be quite possible to translate each of Juergensmeyer's concepts into 
English, and thus into what is widely regarded as a much more universalistic analytical 
vocabulary. If so, the erm panthic could be identified as referring to the mystical and 
spiritual dimension of religious ideas and practice, dh rmic to its more moral and/or social 
dimensions, while its qaumic dimension highlights the capacity of religious ideas and 
loyalties to act as a vehicle for ethno-political mobilisation. Finally I have also found it useful 
to add a fourth dimension, which I have found it convenient to identify as kism tic, to
Juergensmeyer's scheme. Yet although each of these terms is readily translatabl  into English, 
I have nevertheless deliberately avoided doing so. Firstly to keep my analytical categories as 
congruent as possible with local realities, and secondly in an attempt to guard against the 
creeping impact of Euro-, and especially Protestanto-ce tric ideas; and finally because I have 
found that in enables me to present my central thesis with much greater precision than I could 
otherwise have hoped for. 
 
As I see it, during the pre-British period the most active features of popular Punjabi religio  
were concentrated in the panthic and kismetic domains, to which its dharmic dimensions 
were in many respects quite secondary; meanwhile religion as a qaumic phenomenon was 
almost non-existent. But following the rapid growth of socio-political reform movements 
from the late nineteenth century onwards, each of Punjab's religious traditions began to 
organise itself ever more emphatically in q um c terms; as each has done so, each one has 
steadily reinforced its dharmic distinctiveness, but at the cost of ever-growing hostility to the 
panthic and kismetic dimensions. Yet despite the increasingly harsh criticism to which both 
the panthic and the kismetic omponents of Punjabi religion have been subjected by the 
proponents of the new qaumic orthodoxies, these dimensions of Punjabi religion are still of 
immense significance in more personal and private contexts. Although hardly discussed in 
the literature, and routinely dismissed as misguided, irrational and superstitious spokesmen 
for the new orthodoxies – at least some of whom have imposed their judgements down the 
barrel of a gun – I would argue that these currently devalued dimensions remain to this day 
the primary source of spiritual inspiration and personal solace for most Punjabis, and most 
particularly so in contexts of severe adversity. 
 
 The Punjabi context 
 
Yet before I launch into detailed argument, let me first establish just what I mean by Punjab, 
for I have no intention of restricting myself solely to the much truncated Indian state of 
Punjab, nor even the rather larger and considerably more populous region across the border in 
Pakistan. Rather what I have in mind is the fertile plain bounded by the Indus to the west and 
the Yamuna to the east, rising into the foothills of the Himalayas to the north nd tailing ff 
equally fuzzily into the desiccated deserts of Rajasthan to the south. Whilst all the inhabitants 
of this region will normally (electoral politics apart) readily identify themselves as Punjabis 
the social and historical specificities of this region are nevertheless worth reviewing before 
we begin. First of all, it is worth noting that this region had no clear political or 
administrative identity for at least a millennium. Whilst the greater part of Punjab may have 
fallen into the Subeh of Lahore during the Mughal period, it was nevertheless only a 
component (albeit one of very considerable importance) in the structure of a much larger 
Empire. And whilst Maharajah Ranjit Singh successfully incorporated the northern and 
western parts of the region into his self- stablished Kingdom, he was nevertheless unable to 
extend his rule into the cis-Sutlej region, whose rulers – fellow Sikhs though they were – 
preferred to ally themselves with the British East India Company as a means of avoiding the 
Maharaja’s authority. Yet although Punjab experienced an unprecedented degree of political 
 
 
5
and administrative coherence during the subsequent period of British rule, that solidarity did 
not survive Independence. With the collapse of British rule in 1947 Punjab was divided 
between India and Pakistan in the midst of an exceedingly vicious process of ethnic 
cleansing. But those paroxysms did not bring ethno-religious polarisation to a halt. In the 
aftermath of the sacking of the Golden Temple during the course of Operation Bluestar in 
1984, tensions between Punjab’s Hindus and Sikhs reached fever pitch. Although a re-run of 
the events of 1947 seemed for a while to be in prospect, as I write in 1995 all sides seemed to 
have reached a position of exhaustion. Hence the conflict is currently in abeyance. 
 
Yet despite the depth and strength of these ethno-political disjunctions (to which there are 
several parallels on the Pakistani side of the border), there can be no dispute that Punjabis 
share a wide range of social and cultural commonalities. Amongst the most important of 
these is the Punjabi language. Besides bringing then all together within a single verbal 
universe, their common tongue also provides the foundations of their distinctive world-view: 
vigorous, earthy, practical and entrepreneurial, and giving far more respect to iconoclastic 
humour than to abstract intellectual analysis or philosophical argument. Yet despite the 
strength of these tendencies, and a consequent reluctance to accept or respect any kind of 
social, political or clerical hierarchy, the Punjabi tradition is in no way either anti-religious or 
anti-spiritual. On the contrary the key to Punjabi poetry – and there can be few regions in the 
world where poetic inspiration is more popular, more respected or more widely appreciated 
than in Punjab – is the taken-for-granted view that while the ultimate cause of existence is 
utterly transcendent and in that sense unknowable, that self-same Ultimate (whether 
conceptualised as Ram, Satnam or Khuda is quite immaterial) is also comprehensively 
immanent in every aspect of the existent world. It therefore follows that since that Truth 
enlivens (and is therefore present at the very heart) of every living being, it is also within the 
grasp of each and everyone – provided that they develop the wit, the sensitivity, the insight 
and the reflexive determination by means of which to penetrate the self-genera ed v ils of 
maya which obstruct such a realisation.4 
 
If so, it follows that in sharp contrast to contemporary processes of religious polarisation, 
there is a powerful sense in which Punjabi religion has historically manifested itself in a 
sense of spiritual inspiration which flows freely across current ethnic and religious divisions, 
and is consequently quite specifically unbounded. Nor is this easy-going sense of pluralism 
confined to the abstract spheres of poetry and spiritual inspiration. In terms of dress, food, 
music, leisure and entertainment – from games to jokes – a whole range of distinctively 
Punjabi attitudes, assumptions and practices can readily be discerned. So it is that most 
Punjabis willingly, and indeed proudly, identify themselves as such, regardless of whether 
they might otherwise be classified as Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs, and regardless of whether 
they hold Indian, Pakistani, British, United States, Canadian or any passport. Indeed if 
cultural distinctiveness was the sole criteria for the construction of a nation-state, Punjab 
should have so established itself long ago. It is easy to point to many other population groups 
with far fewer initial commonalities than the Punjabis who have done so with considerable 
success. 
 
But in fact Punjab's experience has been quite the reverse. Far from undergoing a process of 
national consolidation, Punjab has been undered by apparently unstoppable processes of 
polarisation during the course of the past century. Even though Punjab’s common religious, 
cultural and linguistic heritage provided an excellent vehicle for political consolidation, its 
potential has been largely eclipsed by the rise of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim revivalism. As a 
result each group has insisted that its own tradition is wholly autonomous, and has therefore 
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sought to eliminate any sign of possible overlaps between its own tradition and those of its 
rivals. "Tradition" has been quite shamelessly adjusted to this end. And despite occasional 
efforts by “leftist” intellectuals to generate a sense of Pan-Punjabi nationalism, religious 
revivalism has in fact proved to be by far the most effective means of political mobilisation. 
No-where has this been clearer than amongst the Sikhs. By the late nineteen eighties, 
hundreds – nay thousands – of idealistic youngsters were felt prepared to lay down their lives 
to assist in the creation of Khalistan, a comprehensively Sikh nation-state, should the call for 
self-sacrifice come. 
 
It is developments of this kind that have set my agenda here. How can such outcomes be 
understood? How and why have such overwhelming processes of polarisation erupted in a 
region which is otherwise marked by far-reaching cultural and religious continuities? Are 
current outcomes the inevitable product of intrinsic and inescapable differences between 
Punjab’s three major religious traditions? Or are they, to the contrary, the outcome of new 
and unprecedented developments in the whole character of those traditions? If so what are 
those developments, and how are they best understood?  
 
The Religious situation in pre-B itish Punjab 
 
The religious history of Punjab contains many paradoxes. On the one hand the region has 
always been a seed-b  of religious innovation. It was here that the initial admixture between 
the indigenous agricultural civilisations of Harappa and Mohenjdaro and the more nomadic 
Aryan invaders from central Asia took place more than three and a half millennia ago, and 
from whose interaction what we now know as classical Hindu civilisation first arose. But
whilst Punjab may therefore have been the very cradle of Hindu civilisation, its centre of 
gravity soon moved off to the east and south. Meanwhile Buddhism became Punjab’s pre-
eminent religious tradition in the 3rd century BCE, in various forms remained so right up until 
the arrival of Islam well over a thousand years later. Hence the majority of Punjabi Muslims, 
and most particularly in the westernmost Potohar region, were much more Buddhist than 
Hindu in their beliefs and practices prior to their conversion to Islam. Moreover, despite 
much mythology about jihadplaying a significant role in this process, there is little or no
evidence to support that view. Far from conversion being precipitated by Hindustan’s new 
rulers unleashing bloodthirsty Muslim warriors on an otherwise defenceless population, the 
prime movers in this shift in religious affiliation were innumerable charism tic Sufi 
preachers, whose teachings – which were based on a powerful synthesis between the gnostic 
theology of Ibn ‘Arabi and local traditions of sahajayana Buddhism – proved immensely 
popular.5 Many of the most successful of these saintly teachers wer immigrants from Central 
Asia, which is where the initial synthesis between these two traditions appears to have taken 
place. Moreover their tombs – as in the case of Baba Farid Shakarganj in Pakpattan, Datta 
Ganj Baksh in Lahore and Shaikh Abdul Qadir in Uch, to cite three leading examples – are 
widely revered to this day, and still attract pilgrims in huge numbers. Last but not least 
Punjab was the home base of Guru Nanak, whose teachings – grounded in an inspired 
synthesis between the nirguna bhakti devotionalism and the antric philosophy of the Nath 
yogis – turned out to be equally popular amongst the non-Muslim population of central 
Punjab a few centuries later.  
 
Yet despite the huge significance of these developments, our current knowledge of just how 
they occurred and what they entailed remains very limited. Whilst this may in part be a result 
of the relative paucity of documentary evidence about religious developments in Punjab, it 
also reflects the long-standing tendency for religious inspiration in th s region to place far 
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more emphasis on reporting immediate gnostic experience than on developing formal 
philosophical arguments. Hence it is poetry, rather than dry textual exegesis, which is, and 
long has been, the most popular format for literary expression in Punjab. But in addition to all 
this a further force has been at work since the end of the nineteenth century: the tendency of 
the vast majority of scholars to assume that each of the region’s religious traditions 
constituted autonomous and free-standing “-isms”. If so it followed that the history, 
demography, and social and cultural experiences of Punjab’s Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 
populations had followed such distinctive trajectories that each could safely be analysed 
entirely independently of the other two. This left little or no space to consider the significance 
of the very substantial overlaps between the three traditions, or whether the units of account 
postulated within such an essentialistic vision actually fitted the empirical task in hand. 
 
But even if it was – and largely still is – assumed that religious history of Punjab could be 
constructed around separate and largely normative accounts of Hindu, Sikh and Islamic 
practice, topped off, if necessary, by a straightforward head-count of the size of each group, 
when the British authorities attempted to carry out just such an exercise in the 1881 Census, 
they soon discovered that empirical reality simply did not fit this procrustean scheme. This 
was not because Punjabis lacked religious commitment per se, but rather because those 
commitments were not ordered in such a way as to allow a straightforward categorisation of 
the population into “Hindus”, “Sikhs” and “Muslims”. As Ibbetson laments, 
It would hardly be expected that any difficulty or uncertainty should be felt in 
classing the natives of the Province under their respective religions. Yet, with 
the single exception of caste, no other one of the details which we have 
recorded is so difficult to fix with exactness, or needs so much explanation and 
limitation before the real value of the figures can be appreciated. .... how far 
they still profess the creed in which they were brought up, how far they really 
believe in what they still profess, and what name should be given to their faith, 
if any, which they have substituted for the dogmas they have abandoned .... 
troubles only a few isolated individuals amongst the native community. ... it is 
difficult in many cases to draw the line between one Indian creed and another; 
for distinctions of faith, being attended by no deep spiritual conviction, are 
marked by a laxity and catholicity of practice which would be impossible to a 
bigot or an enthusiast. (Ibbetson 1883:101). 
 
Yet despite the immense classificatory difficulties which he encountered, Ibbetson found 
plenty of religion: indeed he filled the next fifty quarto pages of his Census Report with a 
mass of carefully presented information about popular religious practice in Punjab, whose 
empirical detail remains unrivalled to this day. This paradox clearly raises a very fundamental 
question. Was it the case, as Ibbetson repeatedly suggests in the course of his discussion, that 
his problems arose because the Census respondents were really so confused and uncertain 
about the precise character of their religious commitments? Or did his difficulties arise 
because the orientalist conceptual framework within which he was working was largely 
inappropriate to the task in hand? 
 
The panthic dimension of Punjabi religion 
 
It is, of course, precisely in order to avoid such fallacies that I have sought to develop less 
eurocentric conceptual schema, and with that in mind let us begin by exploring what I have 
found it convenient to identify as the pan ic dimension of Punjabi religion. The term panth 
is of course a familiar term in vernacular Punjabi, where it is used to identify those who 
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follow a particular spiritual teacher, as in the case of Nanak-panthi, K bir-panthi and so forth. 
Yet although it would be easy enough to find an English equivalent for the concpt of panth,
I have deliberately avoided doing so. My preference is not to translate, but instead to continue 
to utilise the vernacular term as an analytical category in its own right. This does not obviate 
the need for formal definition, however, and with this in mind I shall use the term panth to 
refer to a body of people drawn together by their commitment to the teachings of a specific 
spiritual master, be he living or (more usually) dead. Whilst this definition is somewhat 
wider in scope than is everyday usage, the expansion is quite deliberate, since my objective is 
to establish a categorical term which can be deployed to identify the followers of any spiritual 
teacher, regardless of whether he takes the title Guru, Sant, Yogi, Mahant, Sheikh, Pir or 
more generic Baba. Thus whilst I am quite aware that the term pan  is of sanskritic rather of 
arabic or persian origin, and therefore normally used solely with respect to sectarian groups 
which are broadly Hindu (or at least non-Muslim) in character, my definition is constructed 
in such a way that the term becomes applicable across the entire spectrum of religious 
activity, regardless of conventional distinctions between its Hindu, Sikh and Muslim 
components.  
 
But having thereby escaped from one set of entangleme ts it would be idle to become 
immediately enmeshed in another, so I should immediately emphasise that I am in no way 
suggesting that each of Punjab’s many panths constitutes a separate religion. Rather they are 
much better viewed as variations on a theme. Thus even though the Punjabi religious scene 
includes a large number of spiritual masters who have gained a panth c following, and 
although each such master teaches in his own distinctive way, virtually all nevertheless share 
a similar goal: to find some means of penetrating the self-produced veils of ignorance and 
insensitivity which obstruct our awareness of the ultimate congruence between our individual 
microcosmic selves and the universal macrocosm. And to the extent that this is so, it follows 
that the spiritual dimensions of Punjabi religion can usefully be regarded as the contemporary 
manifestation of a multi-stranded panthic tradition which has its roots in the Sahajayana 
Buddhist tradition which flourished in Punjab over a thousand years ago.6 Sinc  then further 
variations have been added to the theme. In particular Sufi Islam has been a major source of 
further inspiration, but set within a very similar cosmological vision. If so it not only follows 
that Ustad Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan's q wwalis can be regarded as a vivid contemporary 
representation of the original way in which Baba Nanak originally taught, but that both are 
also the heirs of a tradition which stretches back to the dohas f Kabir and sahajiya poets 
such as Jalandari-pa. However outrageous such a suggestion may seem to those committed to 
contemporary essentialist understandings, it is nevertheless wholly in keeping with the 
sensibilities of Punjab’s panthic tradition. After all if Nanak were still with us to comment on 
current developments, it is far from unreasonable to suggest that he would wish to add the 
phrase koi na Sikh to his celebrated epigram koi na Hindu, koi na Musulman.  
 
This is not, of course, to suggest that there are no significant differences between the Islamic, 
Sikh and Hindu traditions, or that Punjab's innumerable Babas, Gurus, Sants, Mahants, Pirs 
and Yogis all preach exactly the same message. Of course not. Each spiritual master develops 
his own preferred theological synthesis, his own preferred perspective on the human 
condition, his own preferred method for achieving the ultimate condition of gnosis. That is 
what inter-panthic differences are all about. But whilst these differences are of considerable 
significance at the level of philosophical debate, Nanak is by no means unusual in suggesting 
that these are little more than an inevitable consequence of maya. H nce the more 
comprehensively one penetrates its illusory veils, and the more richly one appreciates the 
Truth which it conceals, the more insignificant such differences become. From this 
 
 
9
perspective all Punjab’s many p ths emerge as little more than variations on a theme, 
offering alternative routes to the same ineffable goal. Devotees of the Truth can therefore 
quite legitimately express themselves in ither Muslim, or in Sikh, or in Hindu terms (or in a 
synthesis of all three) without feeling any sense of contradiction. 
 
The Kismetic dimension in Punjabi religion 
 
Yet however rich the mystical dimensions of Punjabi religion may be, it would be a great 
mistake to assume that all – or even most – of the religious activity precipitated by Punjab's 
multitude of panthic movements are primarily directed at gaining personal gnostic 
experience. On the contrary, many of the devotees of living Babas, Sants, Pirs and Yogis –
and virtually all of those who flock to the shrines of long-dead saints – are primarily 
concerned with gaining occult assistance in the face adversity, revealing a further dimension 
of religious practice which I have found it convenient to identify as kismetic. Perhaps other 
analysts will be able to suggest a more felicitous term, but it seems to me that the concept of 
kismet (fate, in the crudest of terms) provides a convenient umbrella under which to group all 
those actions and ideological constructions which those who have experienced severe and 
unexpected adversity – such as death, serious illness, infertility and other forms of personal 
affliction, or who have found themselves victims of war, flood, famine, and other similar 
disasters – deploy in an effort to cope with, and above all to make sense of their experience. 
Whilst some may insist that such adversities are simply the outcome of pure (and therefore 
quite meaningless) chance, Punjabis are far from alone in rejecting this bleak philosophy, or 
in seeking to construct a conceptual and religious framework which not only seeks to explain 
disaster, but also the prospect of reversing (or at least subverting) the malign influences 
which caused it. Hence what I have in mind as the kismetic dimension of religion can be 
defined as those ideas, practices and behavioural strategies which are used to explain the 
otherwise inexplicable, and having done so to turn adversity in its tracks.7 
 
Let us begin by reviewing the various possible causes of adversity which the Punjabi tradition 
envisages. First of all, if every event in the existent world is the outcome of the inscrutable 
will of the Creator, it follows that every single being’s kismet (or karma, if one wishes to 
render the same sentiment in Hindu or Sikh terms) is underpinned by divine purpose, even if 
that purpose is by definition beyond human comprehension. The attribution of misfortune to 
kismet in this sense not only provides an answer to the “why me?” question, but also 
eradicates any sense of p rsonal responsibility – and therefore of guilt – for the event itself. If 
a disaster was an act of God, it follows that no amount of human intervention could have 
prevented it. But although such an explanation is a great deal better than nothing is, itonly 
provides a limited degree of psychological satisfaction. If “what is written on one's forehead” 
is by definition both unknowable and unchangeable, it also follows that there is nothing 
whatsoever that one can do about it.  
 
So it is that in addition  kismet, popular religion suggests that misfortune can also be 
precipitated by a wide range of other sources, such as the malicious activities of disembodied 
spirits. Amongst the most important of these are Bhuts, Jinns, Dhags and Churails. 
Suspended in disembodied limbo, these beings are held to be bitterly jealous of those who 
have been fortunate enough to enjoy a human birth. As a result they take every opportunity to 
vent their malevolence on living beings either by causing all manner of accidents, illness or 
injury, or by entering their victims’ very persons as a possessing spirits. Furthermore humans 
are also regarded as having a capacity to wreak occult havoc on their own account, either as a 
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result of the unconscious impact of envy and jealousy (naz r), or through deliberately 
executed magical practices (jadoo and tuna).  
 
That these ideas constitute much more than ‘superstition’ is immediately apparent if we 
consider the way in which ideas of this kind are deployed by those who have suffered some 
kind of personal disaster. Not only does it provide them with a much wider set of possible 
precipitating causes in terms of which to explain their misfortune, but also suggests that if the 
specific source of disaster can be identified, points in the directions of the counter-measures 
which it would be appropriate to take to guard against possible future attacks from the same 
source of malevolence. But just how is that identification to be achieved? It is here that the 
panthic dimension comes firmly to the fore, although on a very different plane from that 
described earlier.  
 
As everyone familiar with popular religious practice in Punjab will be well aware, guiding 
devotees towards an ever-richer level spiritual experience is by no means the only – or ve  
the most important – role which Punjab's spiritual masters fulfil. So it is that whilst having (or 
rather being believed to have) an advanced degree of gnostic awareness is a prerequisite for 
being accepted in the role of Pir, Sant, Yogi or Baba, the vast majority of hose who approach 
such figures do not seek personal enlightenment, but rather to tap into the occult powers of 
siddhi which all such figures – and especially the shrines of their long-dead predecessors – 
are popularly held to possess. Such powers are not only perceived as being diagnostic, so 
enabling them to offer advice on issues of kismetic ausation, but remedial as well. Hence 
powerful saints are held to be able to conjure up siddhic powers of such intensity that they 
can put whichever malevolent force is causing the distress to comprehensive flight. So it is 
that devotees still flock to such figures in huge numbers, searching for remedies for otherwise 
insuperable difficulties.  
 
How should such activities be adjudged? Most members of Punjab's western-educated elite 
tend to argue (so long as they themselves are not in the midst of just such troubles) that all 
such ideas and practices are intrinsically irrational; hence they reject them out of hand as a 
mass of superstitious mumbo-jumbo. But is such scorn really justified? My own experience 
suggests that these practices not only have an underlying logic of their own, but that they can 
also produce some strikingly positive therapeutic outcomes.  
 
In the first place it is worth emphasising that the assumption that spiritual masters – nd even 
more so their tombs – are by definition imbued with sidd ic powers is a well established 
component of all of Punjab's panthic traditions.8 Since the central objective of gnostic 
practice is to rediscover the identity between one's personal being and its universal Source, it 
follows that the higher the level of spiritual experience which any given Baba, Pir, Yogi, Sant 
or Guru achieves, the more comprehensive his experience of oneness with – a d hence is 
capacity to share in the powers of – that Source will be; and since Khuda, Allah, Satnam, 
Ishwar, Paramatma (or whatever epithet one chooses to deploy) is by definition all-seeing and 
all-powerful, spiritual masters will also begin to acquire these self-sam  powers. Moreover, 
since that union becomes even more complete at death – in this case described as urs, 
marriage – it follows that a saint’s mazar, or tomb, is the site of even more comprehensive 
siddhic powers. Nor are such powers confined solely to tombs. If siddhi i  an inevitable 
conjunct of spiritual experience, it follows that all saintly figures will find themselves 
pursued by devotees seeking assistance in the resolution of their kismetic problems; and since 
those powers are held to directly proportional to he intensity of their spiritual commitment, it 
follows that the further they retreat to inaccessible deserts, remote jungles or the depths of the 
 
 
11
Himalayas, the more vigorously sought-after they will tend to become. It is on this basis that 
wonder-working Pirs and Yogis, as well as the mazars and samadhis of their long-dead 
predecessors, still attract huge flocks of devotees to this very day.
 
Yet even if these considerations may begin to account for devotees' belief that possessors of 
siddhic powers may have the capacity to assist them with their troubles, sceptics will 
doubtless still question whether such beliefs and practices can possibly have any kind of 
beneficial effect. Whilst it would be idle to suggest that such practices always have a positive 
outcome, my experience suggests that they may very often do so; and because analyses of 
just how this may occur are very rarely articulated, it is worth doing so here. 
 
In the first place, it should be self-evident that having access to a set of ideas and images 
through which to explain the otherwise inexplicable is deeply reassuring in psychological 
terms. In the absence of such an explanatory system – and w stern science offers no such 
explanations – victims of disaster almost inevitably begin to believe that they must in some 
way have been personally responsible for causing it, even if there is no rational reason for 
reaching that conclusion. But if deep-seat d feelings of guilt well up to fill the yawning 
chasm left by an absence of explanation, it foll ws hat an ideological system which contains 
positive resources for the attribution of meaning can have a very positive therapeutic effect. 
From this perspective visiting a shrine in search of solace not only amounts to a useful 
exercise in occupational therapy, but the whole exercise rendered all the more effective to the 
extent that it is reinforced by a belief that doing so the act itself can trigger off an occult 
process of distress-relief. Added to this the shrine's officiants often display a considerable 
degree of psychotherapeutic skill. Having subtly guided supplicants towards a form of causal 
explanation which is congruent with their immediate personal circumstances, they frequently 
go on to use this as a means of relieving the real, although for practical reasons often 
unarticulatable, source of their distress. To take a simple but all to frequent example, a 
daughter-in-law who finds herself victimised by an unsympathetic and over-exploitative 
mother-in-law may well become so ill that the wider family concludes that the only cure is to 
take her on a therapeutic visit to a distant shrine. Whilst the consultation which takes place on 
her arrival at the shrine may seem at first sight to be nothing more than mumbo-jumbo, closer 
inspection of the process itself soon reveals otherwise, especially when one realises that the 
various interpretations which the saintly officiant puts forward can be read as a kind of 
symbolic algebra through which he begins to explore some much more concrete social 
processe. For example a discussion as to whether a young woman's aberrant behaviour is the 
result of involuntary possession by a malevolent agent such as a bhut or urail, or wether, to 
the contrary it is the result of unconscious, or worse still of conscious, malevolence by 
another human being – ot least by her mother-in-law – engages very directly with real social 
issues. When and if a husband can be persuaded to accept that his wife's distress is the result 
of malfeasance on his mother's part, the effects aredramatic: in doing so he not only accepts 
his wife’s need for greater autonomy, but is implicitly taking his first steps towards partition 
of the entire extended family. By contrast a finding of malfeasance by some other person is 
much less serious, and is likely to be remedied by providing the patient a protective tawiz 
(amulet) to keep the hostile forces to which she has hitherto been subjected at bay. There is 
also third possibility: the attribution of her distress to the presence of a possessing spirit, such 
as a bhut, a jinn or a churail. This might seem, on the face of it, to dodge the issue entirely – 
until one notices that such possessing spirits not only routinely “cause” their victims to spit 
out the otherwise unsayable before they can be persuaded to leave, but that their price for 
leaving (spirits invariably have to be bought off) requires the victim to be provided with 
resources which at least temporarily relieve the pressure upon them.  
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Once we to fix our attention the outcomes of these procedures rath r than becoming 
distracted by the occult character of the local analytical jargon, not only does their underlying 
rationale become much more comprehensible, but it also becomes possible to distance 
ourselves from Oberoi’s suggestion that all this is ocated in some kind of enchanted 
universe. Rather this dimension of Punjabi religion is better understood as being grounded in 
a highly sophisticated – although manifestly symbolic – conceptual framework, whose central 
purpose is to make sense of the trials and tribulations of everyday life. It also allows us to 
recognise that rather than being irrational mumbo-jumbo, the processes of diagnosis and 
treatment to which it give rise are far from incongruent with more “scientific” forms of 
psychotherapy.9 In sum, any suggestion that the kism tic dimension is "mere superstition" 
must be dismissed as both analytically unsustainable and deeply ethnocentric.  
 
Nevertheless these activities have long been a target for ill-informed criticism, not least 
because they are also because it is strongly gendered in character: whilst officiants in kismetic 
activities are overwhelmingly male, supplicants are predominantly female. The reasons for 
this are not hard to identify. Besides being exposed to a much greater degree of personal 
vulnerability in a gender-divided society, women are also expected to shoulder far more 
responsibility for domestic mishaps than are men. It is precisely because kismetic religion 
answers so directly to female concerns that on any Thursday night women can be seen 
lighting lamps at a multitude of little shrines across the length and breadth of Punjab, whilst 
the better known mazars and samadhis draw in crowds of devotees from far and wide. Yet so 
intense is the prejudice against this dimension of Punjabi religious practice that I cannot point 
to a single serious contemporary study of such activities. Scholarship appears to have bent to 
the demands of the formal representatives of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim “orthodoxy”, the vast 
majority of whom not only express extreme hostility towards such practices, unequivocally 
denounce them as shameful, misguided, irreligious and wrong. 
  
The dharmic dimension of Punjabi religion 
 
By contrast with its panthic and kismetic dimensions, the dharmic (or moral) component of 
Punjabi religion is much less esoteric. Nevertheless a straightforward equation between the 
Indic concept ofdharma and the Western concept of morality can be most misleading. In 
standard Hindu usage, dharma refers to all forms of systematic order, whether at a cosmic, a 
social or a personal level. With this in mind the dharmic domain can in my view best be 
defined as the divinely established set of rules to which all activities in the existent world, 
whether amongst humans, animals or even the Gods themselves, should ideally conform. At 
first sight, this definition may seem wholly straightforward to western observers. The 
Christian (and especially Protestant) tradition has always assumed that living in conformity 
with the scripturally legitimated moral and ethical order is a central prerequisite for salvation, 
so much so that that is routinely assumed to be the very essence of what religion is all about. 
But how far is this also true of the Indic context in general, and the Punjabi context in 
particular? In sharp contrast to Eurocentric expectations, the panthic dimension of Punjabi 
religion puts relatively little emphasis on moral conformity: indeed moral conformity is 
widely regarded as largely irrelevant to spiritual progress. This is not to suggest that panthic 
domain actively promotes amorality. On the contrary the great majority of Punjab's spiritual 
masters are – and always have been – highly critical of those who follow the extra-social path 
of sannyassic asceticism, insisting instead that spiritual fulfilment is most richly experienced 
by those who continued to fulfil their everyday social obligations.10 Nevertheless they also 
insist that moral conformity is not, in itself, a route to salvation. Rather the experience of 
 
 
13
ineffable bliss – moksha, sahaj or ishk – can only be achieved by those who step way beyond 
the mundane limitations of the everyday world, to reach a plane of spiritual awareness which 
rises far above, and which is ultimately at odds with, samsaric existence and the d armic 
order. Indeed it is only at the point of comprehensive and irreversible self-extinction –
namely death itself – that the ultimate Truth can be fully experienced.  
 
It is for this reason that the painful paradox of life itself is the central theme in Punjabi 
poetry. Whilst humans are privileged, thanks to their condition of consciousness, to be in a 
position to experience that ultimate Truth, that very condition simultaneously distances them 
– or more accurately still veils them – fro realising the immanent presence of the Source in 
every single fragment of existence. If so it follows that as one’s gnostic awareness becomes 
ever more acute, so the more thrilling – and also the more deeply painful – the very 
experience of life becomes, for whilst that condition necessarily separates the lover from the 
Beloved, it is life and consciousness which allows the very experience of ishk to occur. As 
ever, Bulleh Shah catches these contradictions with immense precision when he sings: 
 
I’m caught in the mouth of a trap  
 
This passion of ours weighs so mountainously heavy  
That just a second's glance can shatter my whole being 
Yet still my efforts yield so little – just echoes of your blows! 
 
I’m caught in the mouth of a trap  
 
But as purity makes its own path, you’ve found your way to me  
Enlivening life, shaking me up, and exchanging such endearments  
That sharing in this secret love brings deep savours of contentment! 
 
I’m caught in the mouth of a trap  
 
Since your resplendent Name illuminates the universe, why reject my passion?  
But keep yourself hidden in the folds of the veil  
To grab my handcuffs right in the middle, dangling me upside down! 
 
 I’m caught in the mouth of a trap11 
 
Hir Ranjha, Punjab’s most popular folktale, makes just the same point. Besides providing 
endless examples of the ways in which dharmiconformity obstructs the experience of ishk, 
the tale’s swift and tragic end also demonstrates that such passion can only be fully 
consummated in death. Waris Shah's epic is therefore wholly congruent with the central
theme of Bulleh Shah's poetry: that whilst the exquisitely bittersweet experience of ishk is 
only possible within the context of samsaric existence, anxious conformity with dharmic 
conventions means little or nothing to the spiritually committed.12 This is not to suggest that 
Punjabi religion lacks a dh rmic dimension, but rather that morality is not derived from – nor 
is it of any great significance within – the panthic domain of spiritual experience. 
 
But having established what the dharmic domain is not, we also need to consider just how it 
is actually constituted. Although it might seem reasonable to expect that the foundations of 
this domain would lie in the system of moral and legal rules developed by each of the 
Punjab’s major religious traditions – the Hindu Dharmashastra, the Sikh Rahit and the 
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Muslim Shari'a – we must nevertheless be cautious here. Can we afford to rely solely on 
textual sources to identify what dharmaconsists of, when the social and moral conventions 
which Punjabis actually follow often differ sharply from those to which Qazis, Pandits and 
other scholarly experts insist they ought to conform? Asking such questions also seems 
particularly appropriate in a society where such priestly specialists are routinely dismissed as 
venial manipulators, constantly inventing spurious rules and regulations to suit their own 
interests – and pockets! Guru Nanak had a great deal to say about that. So whilst we must 
undoubtedly take note of the textually grounded moral schemas on which scholarly experts of 
all kinds routinely rely, I would argue that it is worth paying as much, if not more, attention 
to the popular social conventions in terms of which Punjabis actually organise their everyday 
lives. Once one does so, the far-reaching differences between Hindu, Sikh and Muslim modes 
of behaviour on which the textual sources insist begin to shrink quite dramatically.  
 
As soon as one focuses on popular practice, it is immediately apparent that in a very wide 
range of contexts – including most aspects of family and kinship relations, the ideas and 
conventions deployed in the preparation and consumption of food, in the maintenance of 
purity and the avoidance of pollution, and in sustaining a sense of personal dignity or izzat 
(which together constitute the most crucial components of the popular moral order) – alm st 
everyone follows a very similar set of dharmic rules and conventions, regardless of which of 
the three major religious traditions they are formally affiliated. But alongside these 
substantial continuities there are also a number of equally crucial diacritica, including  
¨ whether death is followed by cremation or burial 
¨ whether boys are circumcised or not 
¨ whether the meat one eats is jatkaor halal  
¨ whether one's kesh (hair) is cut or left uncut 
¨ whether one is vegetarian or non-vegetarian 
¨ whether one smokes tobacco or avoids it  
which invariably serve to establish whether the person in question (and his or her entire 
family) is best identified as Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. 
 
But although this limited range of behavioural markers provides a sufficient basis for 
religious categorisation in the broadest sense, they are clearly only a component (and a 
relatively small one at that) of a much larger spectrum of dharmic activity. Moreover despite 
the efforts of reform movements such as the Arya Samaj, the Singh Sabhas and the Jamaat-i-
Islami to reinforce mutual differentiation, their excited rhetoric has had relatively little impact 
on actual practice: everyday Punjabi lifestyles still display a remarkable degree of continuity 
right across the spectrum of formal religious affiliation. So it is that even though neo-
traditionalist movements have put a great deal of effort into widening the political divisions 
between Punjab’s Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims, there is still a strong sense in which members 
of all three traditions still occupy a common dharmic space.  
 
The Qaumic dimension of Punjabi religion 
 
Nevertheless the upsurge of ethno-r ligious nationalism during the course of the past century 
has led to an increasing degree of dharmic differentiation. As a result of the growing 
influence of religious reform movements, each religious community has made increasingly 
determined efforts to delineate its boundaries as sharply and as unambiguously as possible. 
The most dramatic outcome of this kind of process was the comprehensive separation of the 
region's Muslim population from its Hindu and Sikh components in 1947.13 Rendered into 
my own preferred terminology, this can be represented as a process in which the qaumic 
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dimension of Punjabi religion gained ever-increasing salience; and as this occurred, its 
panthic and kismetic dimensions began to be sidelined, especially in public debate, while its 
dharmic dimension began to be radically transformed in order to support and legitima e an 
ever-greater tendency towards qaumic polarisation. But I must not anticipate myself too 
much: before proceeding further we must first establish just what the qaumic sphere consists 
of, and how it was organised before processes of ethno-religious p larisation had become so 
all-consuming as they are today.  
 
In contrast to panth and dharm, both of which are Sanskritic terms, the word qaum (social 
group or community) like k smet, has Arabic and Persian roots. Although widely used in 
colloquial Punjabi, I shall once again allocate the term a more specific technical meaning, and 
hence use qaumic to refer to the set of ideas and activities by means of which a body of 
people set about closing ranks as a community, and to use their enhanced sense of mutual 
solidarity to advance their collective interests. I  is al o worth emphasising that in sharp 
contrast to the panthic, kismetic and dharmic domains, qaumic activity is by no means 
necessarily religious in character. Qaumicactivity in contemporary Punjab may indeed be so 
organised, but it was not always so. During the early days of the British Raj social and 
political mobilisation was – we have seen – much more commonly articulated in terms of 
solidarities of zat or biraderi, or in other words through communities which the early British 
administrators identified as castes and tribes. 
 
From this perspective the social order of pre-modern Punjab can usefully be regarded – t 
least to a first approximation – as having been constructed around a limited number more or 
less coherently organised and generally localised qaum c ommunities of this kind. Each such 
qaum was normally associated either with a specific hereditary occupation, and – in the case 
of peasants and pastoralists – control over a particular territory. The social boundaries of each 
such group was further reinforced on the one hand by a myth of common descent, and on the 
other by a commitment to endogamy. The prospect thought that all this maelstrom of qaumic 
groups might be ranked in a single comprehensive hierarchy ranging from the purest of 
Brahmins at the top to the most polluted sweepers at the bottom has, of course, exercised 
almost as great a fascination over modern orientalists as it did from nineteenth century British 
administrators. Nevertheless as Ibbetson himself seems to have been on the point of realising, 
any attempts to construct a definitive rank order – even on a local basis – turned out to be 
fruitless. Even though local ideology suggested that the social order was indeed constructed 
around just such a hierarchy, relative rank has turned out to be a far more fluid phenomenon, 
and also one which is riddled with many more internal contradictions than essentialist 
expectations had predicted.  
 
Yet although Denzil Ibbetson's pioneering efforts to conduct such an exercise showed that the 
questions about religious affiliation, no less than those about relative rank, were surrounded 
by so much uncertainty that his attempts to represent his findings in numerical terms were – 
on his own admission – seriously flawed, his questions about q um or zat (the terms were 
deliberately offered as alternatives) yielded a far more coherent and reliable pattern of 
answers. Not only could most respondents identify quite unambiguously to which local qaum 
or zat they belonged, but at least within that local arena there was little dispute about the 
validity of such claims.14 This is hardly surprising. As well as being hereditary, endogamous 
and linked to a specific occupation, these qaumic units (as I would prefer to describe them) 
were self-consciously organised interest groups which formed, amongst other things, the 
basic collective bargaining units within the local jajmani system. Moreover each such qaum 
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normally had recourse to its own well-developed means of resolving (or at least attempting to 
resolve) internal disputes – hepanchayat. 
 
Yet if the qaumic dimension of Punjabi society in this sense was very well organised, the 
1881 Census also revealed was that the great majority of these zat and biraderi included 
Hindu, Sikh and Muslim members: in other words these aggregations cut right across the 
qaumic divisions which loom so large in contemporary Punjab. In other words a major 
change has taken place. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, qaum in the sense of 
zat and biraderi were the principle vehicles for socio-political mobilisation, the religiously 
grounded qaumic divisions were then a very much more marginal phenomenon. There were 
other differences too. During the nineteenth century qaum i  the sense of zat and biraderi had 
little or no association with either the pant ic or the kismetic domains, since individual 
members of any one such qaum invariably displayed a wide and disparate range of panthic 
and kismetic involvements. By contrast there was a great deal more congruence between the 
qaumic and the dharmic domains, for in keeping with the classical concept of varnadharm, 
each local qaum not only sustained its own distinctive set of moral rules and conventions, but 
also a means whereby these could be enforced. If nothing else what all this indicates is that 
only a century ago the pattern of relationships between the panthic, kismetic, dharmic and 
qaumic dimensions of the Punjab's socio-religi us order was strikingly different from that 
which can be witnessed today. Not only was each dimension a good deal more autonomous, 
but only the first three dimensions were clearly religiously inspired – although in quite 
different ways. As such they stood in sharp contrast to the bulk of activities in the qaumic 
domain. But above all religion in the contemporary sense was not a particularly significant 
vehicle for political mobilisation. 
 
Since then much has changed. Although contemporary religious practice in the Punjab is still 
very much a four-dimensional phenomenon, the balance between its four components has 
changed substantially, above all because its q micdimension has undergone a radical shift 
of character. Hence whilst zat and biraderi are still very significant vehicles of political 
mobilisation in local contexts, competition between Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam – 
understood in each case in wholly qaumic terms – now dominates the greater part of political 
activity in larger-scale arenas. As a result virtually all public discussion, including almost all 
forms of academic debate, is framed within the context of an assumption not only that one 
need look no further than these three essentialised entities to understand all aspects of 
contemporary religious activity, but also that the same set of distinctions can be mapped quite 
readily onto the past. But however much this historiographical vision may suit current 
political imperatives, all the empirical evidence indicates that past developments were a great 
deal more complex than this. Once we br ak through contemporary reifications, it becomes 
quite clear that the qaumic dimension of religious activity was of such much more limited 
significance in pre-British days, and that since then each tradition has in effect reinvented the 
greater part of its theological and ideological position, as each formed itself into (or at least 
represented itself as being) the clearly bounded and essentialised qaumic -ism whose 
existence virtually all contemporary debate and discussion takes for granted. 
 
If, however we regard this state of affairs as being an outcome of a process, and one which is 
in any event still far less complete than public rhetoric suggests, a much richer field of 
understanding begins to open up. In particular it allows us to explore the far-reaching imp ct 
which increasing salience of qaumic activity has had on the status of – if not quite so 
comprehensively on practice within – t e other three domains of activity. In the dharmic 
sphere the emergence of late nineteenth century reform movements – such as the Arya Samaj 
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amongst the Hindus, the Singh Sabhas amongst the Sikhs, and the Ahmadiyyas amongst the 
Muslims – led to an immense amount of effort being put into the propagation of new (or as 
those involved insisted, "forgotten") orthodoxies. The Sikh case is particularly instructive in 
this regard, for as Oberoi has shown, this effectively entailed the construction – virtually ab 
initio – of a new dharmic order around which the qaumcould begin to mobilise itself, whilst 
the tradition’s more plural dimensions in the panthic and kismetic domains were subjected to 
ever more vigorous criticism. But these developments were by no means a uniquely Sikh 
phenomenon. Parallel initiatives, although perhaps rather less dramatic in scale, are easy 
enough to identify amongst both the Hindus and the Muslims.  
 
Yet however useful this may be as a means of explaining how and why the p thic and 
kismetic dimensions of Punjabi religion should have faded so comprehensively into the 
background, many readers may still be ceptical about my suggestion that religion was of 
relatively limited significance as a vehicle for qaumic terms during the early British and pre-
British period. After all the Sikh tradition in general, and Gobind Singh's institution of the 
Khalsa in particular, appears on the face of it to be a prime examples of a religiously 
grounded qaumic movement. It is to this issue which we must now turn.  
 
The Sikhs as a Qaum  
 
While there can be no doubt that in a contemporary Punjabi context the Sikhs do indeed form 
a qaum, was that always so? If we go right back to the beginning, all the evidence suggests 
that such a prospect would never have crossed Baba Nanak's mind. Whilst he never tired of 
emphasising the importance of continuing to participate in the everyday social world, the 
whole objective of his teaching –  true panthic style – was to enable his followers to 
transcend their mundane experience of samsaric existence; and because he advocated taking 
a wholly internal route to sahaj, he comprehensively resisted any kind of qaumic 
classification, and was equally disinterested in dharmic i novation. But all this soon began to 
change following Nanak’s death, such that Nanak’s previously inchoate panth began to 
develop ever more explicit qaumic dimensions. Typically enough, his successors' 
headquarters, first in Goindwal and then in Amritsar, became places of pilgrimage; and as 
devotees' offerings began to flow into the movement's central exchequer on an ever-
increasing scale, the Sikh Gurus' adoption of the deliberately ambiguous title Sachah Padshah 
gave further emphasis to their steadily increasing political as well as spiritual power. 
However it was Guru Gobind Singh's creation of a khalsa in 1699 – a qaumic development if 
ever there was one – which was the most significant change of all. By requiring all those who 
accepted the new spiritual discipline to make some very overt, and manifestly dhar ic, 
changes in their everyday lifestyles, khalsa membership directly signalled commitment to a 
new and unmistakably qaumic brotherhood. Yet all this established a new and largely 
unprecedented basis for interpreting what it meant to be a Sikh, we must take care to avoid 
reaching over-hasty conclusions about the precise significance of these developments. It is all 
too easy to misread the past by viewing it uncritically through the distorting lenses of 
contemporary assumptions and expectations, especially when the events in question have 
become the raw material of contemporary myth makers.  
 
Whilst there can be no doubt that the creation of the Sikh khalsa was a highly significant 
qaumic initiative, during Gobind's own lifetime only a minority of Nanak Panthis appear to 
have accepted the Guru's invitation to join the new movement. Hence in its original form the 
Khalsa di  not include all, or even the majority of those who were inspired by the panthic 
dimensions of Nanak's teaching.15 But just what was the status of those who did not join 
 
 
18
Gobind’s new regiment of sant-sipahis? Nineteenth century reformers had no hesitation in 
describing the sahajdharis (as opposed to the keshdharis who joined the new khalsa) as 
"slow-adopters", thereby suggesting that when they eventually gained the courage of their 
convictions they would find their way into the Khalsa. But just how fair was this judgement? 
Not only do we need to remember that this usage was coined by reformers who were deeply 
hostile to panthic pluralism on ideological grounds, but that far from being weak-kneed slow-
adopters, the sahajdharis had good grounds for arguing that the path which they continued to 
follow was much more congruent with Nanak's own teaching than that of the hirsute 
keshdharis.  
 
Putting all this in historical context, it is worth re-emp asising that Banda Bahadur, Gobind's 
political (although not his spiritual) successor, was not a Khalsa member, even if subsequent 
historical revisionists have made strenuous efforts to suggest that he was. Last but not least, 
the use of the term Khalsa to identify a brotherhood of mystically inspired semi-ascetic 
military activists is by no means such a uniquely Sikh phenomenon as virtually all extant 
accounts of Punjabi history tend to assume. As Peter van der Veer relates in his instructive 
account of the development of the Ramanandi panth, ot only does this movement still 
contain a number of loosely aggregated orders of itinerant sadhus which are also known as 
khalsas, but during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries khalsas of a cetic warriors (saint-
soldiers, indeed!) were a salient feature of both the Shaivite and V ishnavite traditions in 
northern India. However they were not holy warriors in the modern sense: members of these 
khalsas fought on a mercenary basis on behalf of a wide variety of rulers, Muslim no less 
than Hindu (van der Veer 1989: 107-137). 
 
Set in this broader context, Gobind Singh's Khalsa emerges as much less unique than 
contemporary Sikh myths would have us suppose: in its time it was but one amongst many, 
even its subsequent history has given it a far greater social and political importance than any 
of its rivals. It is also worth considering just what these khalsas were for, mo t especially in 
political terms, since recently constructed myths not only suggest that Gobind's khalsa was 
unique, but also that it was in essence a qaumic vehicle which enabled Punjabi Sikhs 
(possibly in conjunction with the Punjabi Hindus) to challenge the injustice and exploitation 
of oppressive Muslim rule. Lectures on this theme can regularly be heard in every 
contemporary Gurudwara, and they certainly make a good and rousing story. But how 
congruent are such accounts with historical reality?  
 
Although it is certainly true to say that Gobind Singh pursued an autonomous political agenda 
for the greater part of his life, and also that his formation of a khalsa was mnifestly an effort 
to advance the collective interests of his emergent qaum, it is far from easy to specify against 
whom, and in the face of just what challenges, those interests were being advanced. To argue 
– as uncritical contemporary commentators all to  often suggest – that the Guru's central 
concern was to counter Muslim oppression is altogether too simplistic. In the first place every 
one of Gobind Singh's early military exploits brought him into conflict with local H ndu hill-
rajas, not with the Mughal authorities; and although he and his followers were constantly 
harried by the Imperial authorities after he had moved his headquarters from sheltered Paonta 
to more exposed Anandpur, the resulting conflicts are better understood as reflecting the 
Empire's regional satraps' effort to contain a well-armed local dissident than the outcome of 
deep-rooted religiously-motivated polarisation within the local Punjabi population. The 
argument that Gobind was not systematically engaged in religious war is further sust ined by 
the well-attested fact that the Guru employed a number of Pathan (and therefore Muslim) 
warriors throughout his political career, let alone the further irony that when the Guru met his 
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death in 1708 (at the hands of one of those self-sam Pathan servants) in far-o f Deccan in 
1708, he had left Punjab to offer implicit support to the new Emperor Bahadur Shah's efforts 
to suppress a rival claimant to the Imperial throne, his brother Kam Baksh.16  
 
Hence while Gobind Singh's Khalsa was undoubtedly a qaumic development, in the sense 
that it was a clearly bounded, internally resilient and strongly politically motivated 
brotherhood, what it quite obviously did not do was to unite all those inspired by Nanak's 
teachings – or in other words Sikhs in the broadest sense – into a single coherent community. 
Nor did this begin to occur in the immediate aftermath of the Guru's death. Although the 
khalsa manifestly a potent political symbol for Banda Bahadur, for the late eighteenth century 
misldars, as well as for Maharajah Ranjit Singh – w o identified his government as Sirk r 
Khalsaji – between Gobind's death and the imposition of British rule no serious attempt was 
made to use its ideology as a means of uniting all Sikhs into a socially, culturally and 
politically coherent community. Although it is at least arguable that members of the Khalsa 
were rather more committed than most towards attaining such a goal, at least amongst 
themselves, as Oberoi (1994:24) makes very clear, the Khalsa Sikhs were but one subdivision 
within a whole series of panthic groups which also included Udasis, Nirmalas, Nanak-
Panthis, Sahajdharis, Kukas, Nirankaris, Sarvarias and so forth.  
 
While all these issues could easily be discussed at much greater length, enough has been said 
to underline some basic points about the structure of Punjab's social, political and religious 
order in the pre-British and early-British period. Firstly while its panthic dimension was 
strong and comparatively well organised, and stretched right across the formal religious 
spectrum, the political significance of such panthic movements was relatively limited even 
when they acquired qaumic characteristics. Hence in sharp contrast to developments during 
the century and a half which has passed since Maharaja Ranjit Singh's death, religious 
loyalties, however conceptualised, were little used as a vehicle for social and political 
mobilisation. Hence there was then no sign of the comprehensive polarisation between 
Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs which has since become such a salient feature Punjab’s 
contemporary socio-political order.  
 
The British Raj and its Impact 
 
While it is easy enough to identify the imposition of British rule as being the principal 
precipitant of these changes, tracing out the many strands of action and reaction which were 
set off by the British Raj itself, and which have continued to unfold ever since is such a 
complex task as to be far beyond the scope of this Chapter, so all I can do is pick out its most 
crucial dimensions as a precursor to my concluding discussion of their impact on the various 
dimensions of Punjabi religion. 
 
Following their conquest of the province, Punjab's new rulers saw themselves as having a 
"civilising mission", so much so that they sought quite unashamedly to impose 
comprehensive social, political and cultural hegemony over their subjects, making no secret 
of their view that all things British – whether biological, social, cultural or religious – were 
by definition comprehensively superior to all things Indian. If Indians were ever to progress 
to the same level as their rulers, so the new regime insisted, they too would have to learn to 
be civilised.  
 
Exposure to such an immensely self-confident form of over-rule precipitated very mixed 
feelings amongst its subjects, and nowhere more so than within Punjab's rising, but 
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overwhelming youthful, new educated elite. On the one hand British disdain precipitated 
strong feelings of nationalism: to the subjects of this wholly alien Raj, the need to get 
together to throw out the intruders was self- vident. Yet at the same time they also felt that 
until they had reformed their own society, and above all had remedied the deficiencies which 
enabled the British to establish their Raj in the first place, all their efforts would come to 
nought.  
 
To cut this long story down to a manageable size, let us move straight on to consider by far 
the most important movement of ideological resistance and reform to emerge in late 
nineteenth century Punjab: the Arya Samaj. In contrast to all the religius developments we 
have considered so far, the Samaj owed its existence, and even more so its popularity, to the 
novel socio-political environment generated by the British Raj;18 and since one of its 
principal objectives was political mobilisation, there can be no doubt that it also falls within 
my definition of a q umic movement. Hence it is useful to consider just whom the Samajis 
sought to mobilise, on what basis, for what ends. Let me address these in reverse order. The 
ultimate objective of the Samaj was clearly nationalist: to do away with British rule, and to 
re-establish India's social, political, and cultural autonomy. The means by which the 
movement sought to achieve that goal is equally clear. Indian civilisation had lost its 
autonomy – so the movement's propagandists argued – because the purity and strength of it 
Aryan heritage had been so seriously weakened by growth of irrelevant and unjustifiable 
accretions, with the result that it had been unable to resist two successive alien invasions, the 
first Muslim, and the second British. Given this diagnosis, it followed that without a 
comprehensive program of social, cultural and above all religious reform, there was no 
prospect whatsoever of India regaining its lost strength. Hence in their own version of "back 
to basics", the Arya Samajis insisted that in the interest of national regeneration all 
diversionary accretions and all foreign imports must be discarded forthwith, so enabling 
everyone to return to the true values of their tradition as enshrined in the ancient Vedic 
texts.17  
 
Just what moral and social injunctions the Vedas actually contain need not detain us for long. 
Even more so than texts such as the Hebrew Bible, the Vedas have always been open to a 
wide variety of readings, most particularly because their contents are for the most part so 
cryptic and obscure that their possible meaning and significance is very much an open 
question. Indeed if one accepts – as the Hindu tradition has long held – that the Vedas 
enshrine all possible forms of knowledge, it is quite useful to regard them as a kind of "black 
box" within which support for any argument or analysis which one might choose to make can 
by definition be found. If this is so, the most appropriate way to approach the "Vedic" 
prescriptions put forward by the Arya Samaj is not through an assessment of the accuracy of 
Swami Dayananda's interpretations of the textual sources, but rather through an analysis of 
the meanings which he and his followers chose to assign to them.  
 
The broad outlines of Dayananda's conclusions are well known. Once stripped of its 
subsequent Hindu accretions, the Aryan religion – so the Swami argued – was a 
comprehensively monotheistic faith with clearly defined ethical groundings. As opposed to 
this the whole gamut of popular religion, and most especially practices such as image-
worship, sati, the veneration of saints and their shrines, and the hereditary ascription of caste 
status, was dismissed as wholly alien to the faith. Although it is relatively easy to 
demonstrate that the Vedas themselves offer relatively little support for these conclusions, 
such criticisms largely miss the point. What matters far more is the consequence of this 
interpretation, especially in the context of late nineteenth century Punjab, where Christian
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missionaries were subjecting all aspect of popular religious practice to vitriolic criticism. One 
of the most important results of the Samaji perspective was that virtually everything with 
which the missionaries found fault could now be dismissed as an un-Aryan accretion. In 
ideological terms this was a brilliant move. By surreptitiously adopting the missionaries own 
agenda, Dayananda's wholly unprecedented reading of the ancient Vedas provided his 
followers with a vision of Indian civilisation which might well be highly artificial, but which 
was nevertheless a highly effective means of resisting the denigration to which their 
involvement in the institutions of the British Raj – in which the missionaries formed the 
ideological cutting edge – exposed them.  
 
Nor was that all. Dayananda went on to argue not only that the Aryan tradition was more 
closely congruent with missionaries' ideal of ethical monotheism than trinitarian Christianity, 
but also that it was far older than, and therefore superior to, all of the three Abrahamic 
religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Hence a central component in the force of 
Dayananda's perspective arose from his success in borrowing large chunks of the moral, 
symbolic and conceptual agenda of the new Raj, and having i igenised his borrowings by 
presenting them in Vedic clothes, using them to demonstrate that no matter how physically 
powerful India's arrogant new rulers might be, their own indigenous heritage was in fact far 
superior to all things European. Hence it is hardly surprising that Dayananda's teachings 
found a very enthusiastic audience amongst the newly emergent Western- ducated elite in the 
last of India's major provinces to fall under the control of the Raj.  
 
In this respect Swami Dayananda's tour of Punjab in 1879 was particularly well-timed, since 
it coincided with the emergence of the first set of graduates to have passed right through the 
new educational system. With few local precedents on which to build, not least because the 
Brahmo Samaj was perceived as far too much of a Bengali movement to suit Punjabi tastes, 
these upwardly mobile young graduates had few defences against the poisoned chalice from 
which they had been forced to sup during the course of their education: no wonder that so 
many of them became enthusiastic followers of the Arya Samaj. In addition to 
comprehensively legitimating both their elite status and their "modernity", the Samaj also 
provided a very effective platform from which to begin to challenge the arrogant 
Eurocentrism of the colonial regime. 
 
Conclusion: religious reform and its consequences 
 
While the impact which the Arya Samaj and its many successors has had on social, cultural 
and religious developments throughout the subcontinent is so extensive as to be far beyond 
the scope of this Chapter, let me draw my argument to a conclusion just by restricting myself 
to a Punjab context, but also by limiting myself to answering three very specific questions. 
Firstly just what sorts of people did the Samaj succeed in mobilising within its new 
ideological framework, and just whom did it alienate? Secondly what kind of agenda for 
collective mobilisation did its program establish? And thirdly what impact did this have on 
the four dimensions of Punjabi religion which we have identified?  
 
As far as mobilisation is concerned, the eventual outcome of Samaji nationalism has been 
deeply contradictory. Although its objective was to unite the entire indigenous population of 
India, its in-built anti-Islamic polemic was so strong that it aliena ed – and continues to 
alienate – the vast majority of Indian Muslims; and although many Punjabi Sikhs were 
initially attracted to the Samaj because of its capacity to provide a sense of ideological 
resistance to racism and Eurocentrism, the movement's dismissal of Nanak and his teachings 
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as yet another irrelevant and weakening diversion from Aryan purity soon drove them out 
again. In other words far from presaging the development of a pan-Indian – or even a pan-
Punjabi – nationalism, the Samaj soon put the Punjabi social order onto a track of mutually 
competitive qaumic mobilisation, in which Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims found themselves 
engaged in a vicious circle of ever-intensifying mutual rivalry. 
 
As commitment to qaumic consolidation grew steadily more intense, each group began to 
follow a similar agenda to that developed by the Arya Samaj. Sikhs and then Muslims also 
set about establishing unambiguous boundaries around themselves, with the aim of 
generating the strongest possible sense of moral solidarity amongst those within, the better to 
resist their rivals. Hence the Sikhs and Muslims followed the Hindus in spawning reform 
movements whose central aim was to “restore” their tradition to its original condition of 
pristine purity. So just as Dayananda h d systematically reinterpreted the Vedas to generate a 
novel dharmic order which suited the Hindus’ qa mic objectives, the Tat Khalsa movement 
“rediscovered” a whole series of social and religious practices (eventually codified in the 
rehat maryada) to which they insisted all Sikhs must now conform. As a result the reform 
movements which sprang up in all three traditions began to put an ever-increasing emphasis 
on the need to "restore" dharmic onformity. Similar developments also eventually emerged 
amongst the Muslims, pressed forward by so-called “fundamentalist” groups such as the 
Jamaat-i-Islami. But whilst these developments were in every case far more novel than their 
proponents were ever prepared to admit, and although they are far from being fully 
implemented to this day, they also had far-reaching consequences in other spheres. Not only 
did each tradition set about revamping and rebuilding its dharmic order, but the logic qaumic 
mobilisation was such that each group also sought comprehensively to homogenise itself, 
with the result that the “deviant” panthic and kismetic omponents of religious practice found 
themselves subjected to ever more vicious criticism and attack. Quite apart from their 
allegedly "unmodern" character, the easy-going pluralism which still underpins the greater 
part of popular belief and practices is wholly antithetical to the dynamics of qaumic 
polarisation, as well as to the politically driven vision of dharmic orthodoxy developed within 
– and still enthusiastically supported by – the greater part of Punjab’s western educated urban 
elite.  
 
But although the panthic and kismetic dimensions of the Punjabi tradition have consequently 
been driven to the very margins of public discussion on both sides of the Indo-Pakistani 
border as well as throughout the diaspora, it would be quite wrong to conclude that such 
activities have been eclipsed. Quite the reverse. They remain almost as popular as ever, and 
for very good reasons. Whilst the supporters of publicly conventional neo-orthodxy may 
feel very shamefaced about acknowledging any degree of participation in panthic and
kismetic activities – for when push comes to shove virtually everyone does so – the plain fact 
is that these dimensions of domain religious activity provide an opportunity to explore the 
meaning and purpose of the human condition at a level of sophistication of which the banal 
certainties of protestantised neo-orthodoxy cannot even begin to conceive. Meanwhile neo-
orthodoxy also has a great deal to answer for on its own account. Shameful tragedies such as 
the bloodbath of 1947, the trauma of Bluestar and its aftermath, and the current persecution 
of Christians and Ahmadis in Pakistan are in each case a direct consequence of the rise of 
implacable qaumic intransigence. But if these developments are testing the resources of 
Punjab's the panthic and kismetic traditions virtually to breaking point, those involved would 
do well to remember that if Nanak, Gorakhnath and Fareed could witness what is currently 
being done in the name of Truth, all three would share the same feelings of despair at the 
depth of human folly. 
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NOTES 
1 An argument to this effect is set out in considerable detail in my paper "Islam and the 
Construction of Europe" (Ballard 1996).
2 In addition to an earli r paper of my own (Ballard 1993), the development of these 
processes of ethno-religious polarisation has been explored in much greater depth by Kapur 
(1986). 
3 The term secular is understood in a rather different (although in my view no less bankrupt) 
way in South Asian contexts. 
4 Precisely because it explores these themes so graphically as well as so comprehensively, 
Waris Shah's Hir Ranjha (1983) remains an extremely popular source of spiritual inspiration 
to all Punjabis, whether Hindu, Sikh, Muslimor Christian. 
5 In the Potohar region, close examination of the physical structure of many of the most noted 
Sufi shrines suggests that they have been erected right on top of ancient Buddhist stupas.  
6 Although there is no space to explore the matter in detail here, Das Gupta's immensely 
detailed study (1969) of the Buddhist, Vaishnava and Nath manifestations of the Sahajiya 
tradition in northern India during the mediaeval period reveals a theological and spiritual 
universe which displays a remarkable degree of congruence with those which can still be 
observed in the panthic dimension of contemporary Punjabi religion; and whilst White’s 
study of The Siddha Traditions in Medieval India is ostensibly focused on the ascetic 
dimensions of the Nath Yogis, his examination of the logic of their cosmological vision is of 
much wider relevance, especially in understanding the kismetic dimension of Punjabi 
religion. 
7 As the routine inclusion of a "Your Stars" column in virtually all popular newspapers and 
magazines published in Western Europe and North America serves to emphasise, kis etic 
religion is by no means a uniquely Punjabi phenomenon. 
8 In more formal terms the idea that tapas conveys powers of iddhi on the tapasvi is a wholly 
orthodox component of Hindu mythology; such ideas are particularly elaborately developed 
in the Nath tradition (see White, 1996). 
9 The kismetic world contains its fair share of charlatans, as does western psychotherapy and 
western medicine; but since only those with a positive reputation fo  effectiveness can expect 
an expanding customer base, the loop of positive feedback built into such systems tends to 
weed out the worst offenders.  
10 Nanak's concept of raj men yog is an excellent example of this view. 
11 This represents my own best effor  to render Bulleh Shah’s words into meaningful English. 
I have relied on the Punjabi original set out by Taufiq Rafat (1982:83), but the English 
translation he presents misses many of the poet's more subtle allusions. Puri and Shangari 
(1986: 177 - 181) present a translation of a longer version of the same kafi, set within the 
midst of a useful commentary Bulleh Shah’s ouevre.  
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12 A very useful commentary on the way in which Bulleh Shah systematically uses the 
popular folk tale Hir Ranjha as a point of reference to reach such conclusions can be found in 
Matringe (1992); and while Matringe highlights the joint presence of Vaishnavite, Nath and 
Sufi elements in Hir, Puri and Shagari (1986) read just the same material from a Radha 
Soami Sikh perspective. 
 13 Significantly enough, there was one component of Punjab's population which was almost 
entirely unaffected by Partition, for it stood (and to a large extent still stands) right outside 
this three-way categorisation: the Dalits so-called untouchables. Whilst there is no space to 
explore the issues in detail here, the processes about which Juergensmeyer writes with such 
insight – and which are also the source of the analytical model deployed in this Chapter – 
were also developed as means of resistance to the very processes I am seeking to outline. 
14 As Ibbetson makes clear in a lengthy commentary (1883: 187-190), the vocabulary in 
terms of which the question was posed, and especially its efforts to elicit three different 
segmentary levels of qaumic affiliation cause an immense amount of confusion.  
15 Largely because of the immense symbolic importance of the events which took place at 
Anandpur on Baishaki 1699, most recent historiographers of the Sikh tradition have covered 
them with a strong mythical gloss, such that they implicitly suggest that all good Sikhs must 
have promptly joined the Khalsa. However not only did the newswriter on the spot report that 
many that many of the Brahmins and Khatris explicitly rejected the Guru's invitation to do so, 
but in his careful assessment of the level of support level of support enjoyed by the Khalsa in 
Gobind's lifetime, Grewal (1990: 81) judiciously concludes that "it was yet to become the 
mainstream".  
16 Most Sikh historiographers have sought to cast a veil over these events. So, for example, 
having noted that Gobind Singh attached himself to the Imperial court for more than a year, 
Grewal (1990:79) goes on to suggest that the Guru's sole purpose in doing so was to "get 
Anandpur back". This is most disingenuous. As Banerjee (1972) shows, during the last year 
of his life Gobind and his warriors became Imperial camp followers; those seeking favour 
from the Emperor in such circumstances had no alternative but to offer the imperial 
authorities their implicit allegiance.  
17 Jones (1976) provides an excellent overview of the origins of the Arya Samaj, while 
Graham (1993) explores some of the movements to which it subsequently gave rise. 
18 In his recent and immensely popular polemical essay The Hindu Phenomenon, Girilal Jain 
(1994) articulates a very similar perspective. 
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